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The lay judge system, a quasi-jury system, was introduced in Japan from May 
2009. This paper attempts to analyze Japanese people‟s attitude towards this system by 
examining whether they show a willingness to serve as a lay judge.  The major findings 
from regression analysis are: (1) In general, people with a spouse inclined to adopt a 
negative attitude about serving as a lay judge. This tendency is, however, not observed 
in large cities. (2) Long-time residents and homeowners are more likely to have a 
negative attitude about serving as a lay judge. These results show that a tightly knitted 
interpersonal social network discourages people from serving as a lay judge. Because of 
the life time secrecy obligation and the penalty provisions for those who break this 
obligation, people with closer interpersonal ties are under greater pressure and strains, 
leading to larger psychological cost. The obligation and its penalty should be eased to 
improve people‟s attitudes about serving as a lay judge.  
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1. Introduction 
    
As part of Japan‟s legal reform1 , the lay judge system, Saiban‟in Seido in 
Japanese, was introduced from 21 May 2009. Under this system, ordinary citizens will 
be involved in criminal proceedings as judges to help decide trial outcomes. Citizens are 
selected at random for the most serious criminal cases. “Once this system commences it 
is hoped that more people will feel involved in the justice process. The Ministry of 
Justice has been actively involved in publicizing and promoting the Saiban‟in system so 
that more people will be able to understand its role and functions” (Ministry of Justice 
2009). According to a survey conducted by the Supreme Court, 48% of respondents, 
however, expressed reluctance to serve as a lay judge. The results of a Cabinet Office 
survey showed 78 % were unwilling to take part (Kyodo News 2007). These results are 
despite the efforts of the Ministry of Justice. Thus a question is naturally raised; Why 
are people unwilling to serve as a lay judge? The negative attitude might be partly 
because of the requirement that lay judges are subject to a life time secrecy obligation. 
Lay judges who leak trial-related information will be punished. An American lawyer 
Colin Jones, a of law school professor in Japan, has criticized the secrecy requirement as 
follows: ”If the system‟s purpose is to educate the public about trials and have their 
views reflected in the criminal justice system, gagging participants for life seems 
counterproductive” (Jones 2009). From the standpoint of economics, the secrecy 
requirement can be considered to reduce the incentive to serve as a lay judge. 
  The Supreme Court issued a public promotional DVD to try and educate citizens 
about the lay judge system. The story of the DVD can be described as follows:  One day, 
Mr. Murase, a typical Japanese white collar worker, receives a letter from the Supreme 
Court summoning him to act as a lay judge. “Having initially decided to refuse the 
request he is encouraged by his wife and eldest daughter to seize the opportunity and 
let his subordinates in the office have a chance to get by on their own... In the process of 
the trial Mr. Murase is exposed to a number of judicial and moral dilemmas, but is also 
able to spend more time at home with his family and learn to trust his juniors at work to 
do their jobs by themselves.” (Harris 2007). This story, however, makes no mention of an 
important issue, and so is out of touch with reality. As a matter of course, a lay judge 
must not divulge information to work place colleagues, neighbors and family members. 
                                                   
1 Some works are concerned with Japan‟s legal reforms of the lawyer market (Kinoshita 
2000, 2002; Ginsburg and Hoetker 2006). 
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Inevitably, Mr. Murase would like to call for comments from his supportive family when 
he is confronted with difficulties in the trial. It seems also plausible that the supportive 
family and the trustful colleagues in his work place ask him about trial-related 
information. If a lay judge has supportive and trustful people such as family members 
and colleagues surrounding him or her, there are may be situations in which a lay judge 
might be tempted to leak trial-related information. The secrecy requirement seems to be 
a more severe restriction for those who have the close interpersonal ties within a tightly 
knitted group such as a community or family. These people communicate and interact 
with members of their group through various channels2. As a consequence, a lay judge 
with such close ties is more apt to be tempted to reveal information3. A lay judge is thus 
exposed to a moral dilemma and an imposed burden overcoming such temptation, 
resulting in psychological cost. The secrecy requirement interacts with interpersonal 
ties, leading to discourage people from serving as a community servant.  
To make the lay judge system effective and for it to function well, it is important to 
examine how it was designed. Jurists have paid much attention to the lay judge system, 
especially from a comparative point of view (e.g., Dawson 1960; Landsman 2003; Hans 
2003, 2008). Recently, a number of jurists have explored the lay judge system as it 
applies to Japan (e.g., Bloom 2005; Ambler 2007; Wilson 2007; Levin 2008; Jones 2008; 
Soldwedel 2009). No speculation, however, has taken place concerning the incentives for 
citizens to serve as lay judges. Necessarily, economic analysis is called for to investigate 
how incentives to participate in the system increase4. Thanks to “Social and Political 
Consciousness Survey in 21st Century Japan”, researchers can obtain individual level 
data about people‟s attitudes towards serving as a lay judge. This paper uses this data 
to empirically analyze the incentive problem for the lay judge system by shedding light 
on the interaction between the secrecy requirement and interpersonal social networks. 
Further, based on findings arrived at through statistical estimation, some policy 
implications are suggested.  
       The organization of this paper is as follows:  Section II gives background and 
provides an overview of the lay judge system. Some testable hypotheses about citizens‟ 
attitudes about serving as lay judges are then presented.  Section III details the 
                                                   
2 Close ties within a community are considered to be social capital (Putnam 2000). 
3 It is found that surrounding people such as family members have an influence on an 
individual‟s opinion and political standpoint (Warner 1991; Edlund and Pande 
2002 ;Washington 2008). This can be explained theoretically (Becker and Murphy 2000). 
4 Voigt (2008) tried to examine how lay participation is associated with corruption 
within the judiciary, government effectiveness, and total factor productivity. 
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construction of the data and a simple econometric framework to examine the 
hypotheses.  The results of the estimations and discussion are provided in Section IV.  
The final section offers concluding observations and some policy implications.   
 
2. Overview of the Lay Judge system in Japan  
 
2.1. The lay judge system 
  Long-term economic decline Japan suffered during the 1990s forced the Government 
to institute various reforms to promote economic recovery under increasing 
international competitive pressure. “As part of this change, reformers also sought to 
revise the legal system. Japan‟s legal system has been widely criticized as being an 
insular bureaucracy detached from the needs of the people.” (Soldwedel 2008, p. 1419)5. 
In 1999, the government of Japan established the Justice System Reform Council 
(JSRC) for the purpose of studying basic policies and modifying the legal system. The 
legal reforms presented by JSRC are based on three pillars: (1) achieving “a justice 
system that meets public expectations”, (2) reforming “the legal profession supporting 
the justice system”, (3) “establishment of a popular base” (JSRC 2001, Chapter I Part 3).  
  The third pillar is concerned with the introduction of a lay judge system where 
citizens are required to take part in serious criminal trials6. “For the first time in 
Japan‟s judicial history, ordinary citizens will have their opinions directly reflected in 
trials, although Japan used a limited jury system between 1928 and 1943 in which 
jurors were chosen from among male tax payers over the age of 307.” (Japan Times, 
2007). Lay judges are selected from lists of registered voters8. Although disagreement 
                                                   
5 In addition to realizing better justice and democracy, the lay judge system in the 21st 
century can be viewed as a measure for making trials shorter and more efficient under 
the increasing international competitive pressure (Anderson and Nolan 2004). 
Considering the origin of civil participation in trials, the innovations for the system 
were induced in response to the requirement for improvement of economic efficiency. 
“the use of laymen within the common law system was not the result of careful 
reflection or an appraisal of their virtues and defects; it came in the twelfth and early 
thirteenth centuries because of a driving need to economize on the time of professional 
judges” (Dawson 1960, p.293). 
6 The lay judge system of Japan is said to be closely modeled on the French and German 
systems of “trial by consultation” or “mixed jury” where professional judges and citizens 
work together (Japan Times 2004; Boom 2005; Soldwedel, 2008).  
7 “A jury system based on the Anglo-American model was used…The underlying reason 
for its abolition must have been the failure of democracy in a country in the grip of 
surging militarism.” (Japan Times, 2004). 
8 Citizens are ineligible for reasons such as advanced age, criminal history, government 
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exists concerning the number of lay judges to be selected, members of panels are 
decided as follows: “six citizens are selected at random…under the guidance of three 
professional judges. The nine-member panels have to determine not only guilt or 
innocence, but also any punishment involved.” (Kamiya, 2009)9.  
The lay judge system aims to expand citizen participation in the justice system and to 
reflect public views on the administration of the courts. Actually, a simple calculation 
shows “About 2,600 cases that would be subject to a lay judge trial took place in fiscal 
2007, according to the Supreme Court. Based on that number, the court estimates that 
one in 5,000 citizens will likely participate in proceedings either as lay judges or their 
substitutes at 50 district courts and 10 branches nationwide.” (Kamaiya, 2008). 
Although the Supreme Court makes efforts to minimize the cost of serving as a lay 
judge10, about half of all Japanese citizens do not show any willingness to serve as a lay 
judge (Kyodo News 2007). Such a negative tendency makes it difficult to achieve the 
purpose of the lay judge system. One of the main reasons why people are reluctant to 
serve as a lay judge is the requirement that lay judges must not reveal trial related 
information11. The original plan for a penalty for a breach of confidentiality was that 
those who revealed details of deliberations could be imprisoned for up to one year or 
fined a maximum of 500,000 yen. In response to the criticism about the severity of the 
confidentiality requirements, “the revisions made in the Diet…calls for less stringent 
penalties.”(Japan Times 2004). For instance, lay judges who divulge private information 
or comments by panel members while on duty will be imprisoned for up to six months or 
fined a maximum of 500,000 yen. The same penalties will be imposed on those who 
reveal the “deliberation process” for monetary gain. Those who reveal the process 
without such intent will be fined up to 500,000 yen (Japan Times 2004). Despite of the 
revisions, the severe requirements for confidentiality have a detrimental effect on a lay 
                                                                                                                                                     
member, and employment status ( Soldwedel 2008).  
9 The lay judge system differs from the jury system in the United States in various 
ways. For instance, lay judges decide issues of fact (guilty or innocence) and law 
(punishment), whereas United States juries only determine issues of fact (Jones 2008). 
The jury system, where generally unanimous verdicts are required for a conviction of a 
crime, a majority vote usually determines culpability in Japan‟s lay judge system (Jones 
2008). 
10 “Seven in 10 trials will be completed within 3 days” (Nakai 2008). “The detailed 
procedure… will help remove an unnecessary burden on people who cannot sit on the 
court bench from beginning to end “(Japan Times 2007). 
11 Information contains remarks made by panel members during deliberations and 
privacy matters involving people implicated in cases (Japan Times 2004) 
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judge‟s activities and thus impede public participation (Japan Times 2004)12.   
 
2.2. Social networks and attitude to serve as a lay judge 
  Opinions vary regarding the effects on legal issues of the cultural characteristics of 
Japan. Some researchers point out that Japanese culture, which places a high value on 
group relationships and social norms provides a powerful deterrent for crime in Japan 
(e.g., Bloom 2005; Yamamura 2008b, 2009a). Kawashima (1963) focused on the cultural 
preference for informal mechanisms of dispute resolution in Japan, asserting that the 
harmonious nature of Japanese society discouraged people from litigating. If this line is 
followed, Japanese would appear as reluctant to serve as a lay judge. As a consequence, 
Japanese cultural attitudes will impede the effectiveness of a lay judge system (Bloom 
2005). Contrary to these assertions, considering traffic accidents, Ramseyer and 
Nakazato (1999:ch. 4) argued that despite the consensual nature of Japanese society 
and notwithstanding any costs involved in Japanese litigation, heirs do not ignore the 
law and do not eat their losses. Consistent with this, Ginsburg and Hoetker (2006) find 
no supporting evidence for the hypothesis that cultural factors play a major role in 
Japan.  
Yamamura (2008a) bridged the gap between these opposing views concerning the 
effects of Japanese culture. Social interaction among community members was found to 
continue to play a crucial role for conflicts resolution in modern Japan, although to a 
certain extent people depended on lawyers to formally resolve conflicts (Yamamura 
2008a). If colleagues share various kinds of information and know each other through 
long-term and continual personal interaction, social networks and social trust among 
them are formed (Hayami 2001). It is widely acknowledged that social networks 
enhance civic participation in formal or informal social activities (Putnam 2000). If this 
is correct, social networks would encourage people to serve as lay judges. Nevertheless, 
as earlier stated, the severe secrecy requirement inhibits lay judges from freely 
discussing trials with colleagues and family. Thus, in respect to a trial they participate 
in, lay judges cannot behave as full members of their social network. In turning to deal 
with the relationship between a social network and civic participation in the lay judge 
system, it is worthwhile to consider the question of how a social network is associated 
with the effectiveness of the lay judge system when the severe secrecy requirement 
                                                   
12 The media expressed concern that heavy penalties would lead to the restriction of 
freedom of the press (Japan Times 2004). 
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exists.  
Figure 1 (a) shows a comparison between people with or without a spouse 
concerning willingness to serve as a lay judge. I see from it that people with a spouse 
are less apt to want to serve than those without a spouse. It seems appropriate that a 
basic personal relationship exists in a family. The relationship between a husband and 
wife can be considered to be a profoundly intimate one, even though there is the 
possibility of divorce. If this is true, I deduce from Figure 1 (a) that intimate 
interpersonal relationships discourage people from serving as a lay judge. Further, 
Figure 1 (b) compares long-residents and others; showing that long-residents are less 
likely to serve than others. I see from Figure 1 (c), comparing homeowners and 
non-homeowners, that homeowners are less inclined to serve than non-homeowners. 
Long-residents and homeowners are likely to invest in social capital and so be members 
of social networks (DiPasquale and Glaeser, 1999; Hilber 2007). Considering that 
observed in Figure 1(b) and (c), social networks result in the impediment of people‟s 
participation in the lay judge system. This is contrary to the argument of Putnam (2000) 
that social networks enhance people‟s involvement in social activities. My conjecture is 
that the secrecy requirement imposes a large burden on lay judges who belong to a 
social network than it does on others. Ordinarily, people belonging to a social network 
are likely to freely discuss various matters with other members. Nevertheless, if people 
within a social network become a lay judge, if asked about a trial by a network member, 
they cannot discuss, resulting in a dilemma and psychological cost. Even if members of 
a social network do not ask about trial-related information, lay judges within a social 
network would be frustrated at the inhibition related to revealing trial-related 
information to members. Such frustration also seems to be interpreted as a 
psychological cost
13
. These arguments are summarized in the following hypothesis 
about the effects of a social network on people‟s willingness to serve as a lay judge: 
Hypothesis: Interaction of the secrecy requirement causes a negative externality of the 
social network, leading to impediment of people‟s participation in the lay judge system. 
 
2.3. Opportunity cost of serving as a lay judge. 
  People would tend to avoid serving as a lay judge because of the huge time 
commitment. For this reason the government seeks to compensate by granting a 
                                                   
13 According to the situation, a social network enhances punishing behavior, leading to 
a negative effect on its members (Reuben and van Winden 2008). 
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financial reward that does not exceed 10,000 Yen (about 100 US$) (Supreme Court of 
Japan, 2009)14. The amount of the compensation partly depends upon the cost of 
transportation and the hours served. Under these conditions I consider the opportunity 
cost of serving as a lay judge. 
I assume that a person is self employed and that every day served as a lay judge is a 
day‟s earnings lost. Thus it is a straightforward, onerous economic burden. A person 
would obviously be adamantly opposed to jury duty if a day‟s lost earnings outweighed 
the compensation paid by the government. Based on the data used for statistical 
analyses in this paper, a self-employed person‟s annual income is more than 4 million 
yen15. If 4 million yen is divided by the 246 annual working days, an average day‟s 
earnings is about 16200 yen; much higher than any compensation paid by the 
government16. Hence, self-employed persons are generally expected to try to avoid 
serving as a lay judge. I now assume that a person has a fairly senior managerial job. It 
would not matter to him/her whether the company gives him/her paid time off. It will 
also not matter to how much the government pays as compensation. Such a person will 
strongly want to avoid jury duty as a lot of their work would not get done while they are 
away. Co-workers might help while that person was on a jury, but most will be waiting 
for their return to work. The result would be that that person would have to work 
evenings and weekends to get caught. Thus the time spent as a lay judge would simply 
be valuable time lost.  
  
3. Estimated Model and Interaction of Results.  
3.1. Data  
    This paper used individual level data including information such as attitude about 
serving as a lay judge, years of living at the current address, homeownership, schooling 
                                                   
14 Companies are not obliged to give paid time off for serving as a lay judge (Supreme 
Court of Japan, 2009). There are no data about whether companies give paid time off for 
serving as a lay judge, although such considerations appear critical. However, this is 
beyond the scope of this paper and needs to be examined in a future study. 
15 76 % of self employed persons earned over 4 million yen a year. 
16 Under the labour standards law (article 35), an employer shall provide workers at 
least one rest day per week 
(http://info.pref.fukui.jp/kokusai/tagengo/html_e/konnatoki/3sigoto/e_hourei/roudou.ht
ml: accessed on August 21, 2009). In reality, most companies make every Saturday and 
Sunday holidays. As well, there are national holidays. In total, Japanese people 
ordinarily have 119 non-working days annually. Hence, people work approximately246 
days a year in Japan; the figure I take for my calculations.  
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years, demographics (age and sex) status, and household income17. This data was 
compiled from: “Social and Political Consciousness Survey in 21st Century Japan” 
(GLOPE 2005 hereafter) conducted across all Japan in 2005. Sample points are divided 
into 5 groups. Cities and towns were divided into 5 groups according to population size; 
15 metropolitan cities, cities with at least 200,000 people, cities with at least 100,000 
people, other cities, and towns and villages. Three thousand adults were invited to 
participate in the survey with stratified two-stage random sampling. The survey 
collected data on 1397 adults, a response rate of 46.6%.  
The construction of samples used in this research is shown in Table 1. The original 
sample contained 1397 observations. Among these observations, 1200 responded to the 
question about the lay judge system. I omitted observations without valid answers for 
respondent‟s characteristics, thus the sample size became 774. This sample was used for 
the basic statistics in Table 2 and for the estimations reported in Table 3. Further, the 
774 samples were divided into residents in mega-cities (133) and other places (641. 
These samples were used for the estimations in Table 4. 
 
3.2.  Function form 
  Following from the discussion above, to examine people‟s willingness to serve as a 
lay judge, the estimated function takes the following form: 
 
Lay judge in = 0 + 1 (Spouse dummy) in +2 (Long residents) in + 3 (Homeowner) in 
+4(Female) in +5 Schooling years in +5Age in +6 Koizumi support in +7 Self-employed 
in +8 Manager in +9 (Household income 200~400) in +10 (Household income 400~600) 
in +11 (Household income 600~800) in +12 (Household income 800~) in + fn + uimn , 
where Lay judge in represents the dependent variable in individual i, city size where 
individual resides n. Regression parameters are symbolized by ‟. ‟ reported in Tables 
3 and 4 is the marginal effect. Unobservable city size specific effects are represented by 
fn, and are controlled by dummy variables. uin represents the error term. The empirical 
model was estimated using Probit analysis since Lay judge is a dummy variable that 
takes 1 if an individual is willing to serve as a lay judge, otherwise it is 0.  
                                                   
17 Data for this secondary analysis is "Social and Political Consciousness Survey in 21st 
Century Japan (GLOPE 2005)”. This data was collated by Waseda University Centre of 
Excellence Program for the 21st Century: Constructing Open Political-Economic 
Systems (21 COE-GLOPE). The research was subcontracted to Chuo Chosa-Sha. Data 
was provided by the Social Science Japan Data Archive, Information Center for Social 
Science Research on Japan, Institute of Social Science, The University of Tokyo. 
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I now turn to the key variables considered as proxies for a social network. Spouse 
dummy was 1 if a male had a spouse, otherwise it is 0. As shown in Figure 1(a), a 
willingness to serve as a lay judge depended on whether an individual had a spouse. 
Relation between husband and wife seems a basic ingredient of a social network. Spouse 
dummy was expected to take a negative sign. Long residents become 1 if an individual 
resides at the current address for longer than 20 years, otherwise it is 0. Homeowners 
become 1 if an individual owns a home, otherwise it is 0. As argued in earlier research 
(DiPasquale and Glaeser 1999; Hilber 2007), long term residents and homeowners are 
more likely to belong to a social network. Long term residents and Homeowners are 
anticipated to take negative signs.  
With respect to other individual characteristics, Female is a gender dummy which 
takes 1 if an individual is female, otherwise 0. Schooling years and Age are individual‟s 
schooling years and ages, respectively. Furthermore, household income level is captured 
by dummy variables. Those who have an annual household income lower than 2 million 
yen are defaulted. Household income 2~4 takes 1 if an individual has a household 
income 2~4 million yen, otherwise 0. Household income 4~6 takes 1 if an individual has 
a household income 4~6 million yen, otherwise 0. Household income 6~8 takes 1 if an 
individual has a household income 6~8 million yen, otherwise 0. Household income 8 ~ 
takes 1 if an individual has a household income higher than 8 million yen, otherwise 0. 
Coefficient values of household income dummies can be interpreted as measuring the 
degree of difference from the lowest household income group. 
  Social networks seem to decline with economic development (Greif 1994, 2002). I 
deduce from this that suburban people would have closer social networks than urban 
dwellers. This is because with economic development, urban areas such as the 15 
metropolitan cities are more likely to develop than other types of areas. Table 2 shows 
basic statistics of the variables used for estimations and compares the values of 
mega-cities (15 metropolitan cities) with those of other areas. Looking at the first row 
shows that 28.5 % of mega-city dwellers show a willingness to serve as a lay judge, 
while 24.9% of other areas do. This might be partly because social networks within 
mega cities are less intimate so that any negative externality coming from a social 
network is smaller. It is noteworthy that the human capital accumulated through 
education seems larger in urban areas18. Therefore urban people with basic knowledge 
                                                   
18 In Japan, knowledge about the law is usually obtained at a university so that the 
effect of education on legally orientated participation is an increasing return to scale. 
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about the law might feel at ease serving as a lay judge19. With respect to proxies for a 
social network, rates of having a spouse, long-term residents and homeowners in 
mega-cities are distinctly lower than in other areas. In particular, the long-term 
resident rate for mega-cities (9.0%) is remarkably lower than for other areas (20.7). It 
follows from this that social networks in urban areas are smaller and more fragile than 
in other areas, which is consistent with my hypothesis. I see from schooling years that 
urban people are more educated than those in other areas, which supports the 
conjecture that human capital enhances people‟s involvement.  
  As discussed earlier, the opportunity cost for self-employed people and managers is 
higher than for others, leading to these people being reluctant to serve as a lay judge. 
For the purpose of examining how opportunity cost influences attitudes about the lay 
judge system, self-employed and managerial dummies are incorporated as independent 
variable. The signs of self-employed and managerial dummies are expected to be 
negative.  
It seems important to take politics into account when a person‟s attitude about the lay 
judge system is considered. The legal reform was mainly promoted under the Koizumi 
Administration during the 2001 - 2006 period. In other words, the Koizumi 
Administration took the initiative regarding this legal reform. A person‟s political 
position seems to be reflected in their attitude about the lay judge system.  The 
questionnaire used included the question: “Do you support the Koizumi 
Administration?” The responses available were “Yes, I strongly support”,“Yes, I 
support”, ”No, I do not support”, and “No. I do not support at al”. I define the Koizumi 
supporter dummy which takes 1 when response‟s are “Yes, I strongly support” or “Yes, I 
support”, otherwise 0. To capture the political position, a Koizumi supporter dummy is 
incorporated as an independent variable. 
That observed in Table 2 shows that socio-economic conditions vary according to city 
size. I divide the sample into residents in mega-cities (urban areas) and other places 
(other areas) and then conduct Probit estimation to investigate how and to what extent 
socio-economic circumstances influence people‟s attitudes. 
                                                   
19 Numbers of lawyers in urban areas are far larger than in other areas (Yamamura 
2008). There are greatly disproportionate numbers of cases of litigation between urban 
and other areas (Ginsburg and Hoetker 2006). This inevitably gives rise to differences of 
experience of trials between urban and other areas. It will be necessary to investigate 
how the experience of trials affects the attitudes of people toward the lay judge system. 
Nonetheless, because of a lack of data, such an investigation cannot be conducted at this 
time. 
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4. Results and Discussion  
4.1.  Results 
Table 3 sets out the results, using all samples, regarding willingness to serve as a lay 
judge. The results of using all independent variables are seen in  column (3). 
Long-term residents seem to be homeowners, resulting in correlation between the 
groups. Thus, to alleviate colinearity, alternative estimations omitting the homeowner 
dummy or the long-term resident dummy, are conducted. The results are reported in 
columns (1) and (2). As anticipated previously, the Spouse, Long-term residents and 
Homeowner dummies produced negative signs in all estimations, while most are also 
statistically significant. This implies that social networks reduce the incentive for 
people to serve as lay judges. The Female dummy takes a negative sign and is 
statistically significant at the 1 % level in all estimations. My interpretation is that 
people without a job can allocate time to form social networks, which are considered to 
be a positive externality caused by the labor market. In Japan, females are less likely to 
have a full time job and so are more likely to belong to social networks (Yamamura, 
2009b). As a consequence, females are expected to incur larger psychological costs from 
serving as lay judges than males. In other words, the negative externality from a social 
network is larger for females than males.  
With respect to schooling years, signs of the coefficient become positive, implying that 
people with larger human capital are more inclined to participate in the lay judge 
system. In terms of the effects of opportunity costs, Self-employed and manager 
dummies are not statistically significant, implying that opportunity cost is not reflected 
in a person‟s attitude. This is inconsistent with the anticipation. A plausible explanation 
is that this function also includes household income dummies, thereby capturing the 
effects of opportunity cost. As for political position, the Koizumi supporter dummy 
yields the predicted positive sign and is statistically significant at the 1 % level. This 
tells us that a person‟s political position is associated with their attitude about the lay 
judge system.  Dummies of household income produced positive signs in all cases. Also, 
the larger both coefficient and t-values become, the higher household income levels are. 
This tells me that people with higher household incomes are more willing to serve as lay 
judges. My conjecture is that if one serves as a lay judge, one cannot work during the 
trial. In such a case, people working at large-scale enterprises are able to take paid 
13 
 
leave20. Those who work at a company in an economic slump, who can be considered to 
belong to a low income group, are expected to confront more serious difficulties in 
participation. It seems that workers at a debt-laden or insolvent company will not be 
able take paid leave. In some cases, these workers if serving as a lay judge might be 
dismissed for neglect of duty. As a consequence, those who work at a struggling 
company will be reluctant to serve as lay judges. 
For a closer examination, I turn to Table 4, which shows the results of using samples 
divided into residents in mega-cities and in other places. From here I can examine how 
socio-economic circumstances such as the labor or housing markets influence people‟s 
attitudes concerning the lay judge system. As proxies for the social network, the Spouse 
dummy produced positive signs in columns (1)-(3) despite being statistically 
insignificant, whereas it produced significant negative signs in columns (4)-(6). My 
interpretation is that the wage level in urban areas is higher than other areas, causing 
urban people to allocate more time to work than to being with a spouse. Consequently, 
the relationship between husband and wife is less intimate in urban areas than others 
so that in urban areas having a spouse does not influence willingness to serve as a lay 
judge. Consistent with the expectation, the Long-term resident dummy yields negative 
signs in mega-cities and other places while being statistically significant only in other 
places. The Homeowner dummy produces the anticipated negative signs in all 
estimations. This is statistically significant at the 1 % level in urban areas but is not 
significant in other areas. Furthermore, it is interesting to observe that absolute 
coefficient values in urban areas are approximately 0.25, which is distinctly larger than 
the 0.04 and 0.01 found in other areas. It follows from that observed about the 
Homeowner dummy that the homeowner effect is larger on the willingness to serve as a 
lay judge in urban areas than in other areas. According to Hilber (2007), in more 
built-up neighborhoods, homeowners are largely protected from inflows of newcomers 
that dilute the net benefit from social networks. Areas with little developable land are 
less apt to decrease the benefit from social networks and provide higher incentives to 
invest in social networks.  In Japan, urban areas are considered to be built-up ones 
with little developable land and therefore have greater social networks. Therefore, 
urban homeowners are more likely to enjoy not only social network benefits, but also 
incur higher psychological costs if serving as lay judges. Homeowners in urban areas 
will thus be more reluctant to serve as a lay judge than homeowners in other areas.  
                                                   
20 It should be noted that household income cannot exactly reflect the individual‟s job 
status.  
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The Female dummy produces negative signs in all estimations. This is statistically 
significant at the 1 % level in non-urban areas but not significant in urban ones. It 
seems surprising that t absolute coefficient values for non-urban areas are over 0.10, 
which is about three times larger than in urban areas. Hence, there is a remarkable 
difference between genders about willingness to serve as lay judges in non-urban areas 
but there is no difference in urban ones. As argued by Jacobs, an urban area is 
characterized by a concentration of diverse industries (Jacobs 1969). Hence, a large 
number of different companies are located in urban areas and so the demand for labor is 
larger and has more variety than in other areas. Hence, females in urban areas have 
more opportunity to have a full-time job. Therefore, the market conditions females 
confront in urban areas does not differ from that of males, so that a female‟s attitude 
towards the lay judge system will not differ from a male‟s one. As a result of the larger 
labor supply and demand in urban areas, the labor market is thought to be more 
competitive and more functional. Hence, people in urban areas will have a greater 
chance to get a new job even if dismissed from one. As a consequence, labor is more 
mobile in urban areas. Under this labor market condition, job status is less likely to 
influence willingness to serve as a lay judge. Consistent with this anticipation, in urban 
areas, self-employed and manager dummies produce positive signs, despite being 
statistically insignificant. Furthermore, household income dummies yield both positive 
and negative signs and are not statistically significant. On the other hand, I see from 
the results of other areas, that self-employed and manager dummies yield the negative 
signs. What is more, moving from the lowest to the highest income group, the estimated 
coefficients and t-values increase monotonically, which is similar to those shown in 
Table 3. This is presumably because of the immobility of labor in other areas.  
Concerning political position, the signs of Koizumi Supporter dummies are positive as 
expected, and are statistically significant in all estimations. The magnitudes of the 
coefficients in urban areas are approximately two times larger than those in other areas. 
This implies that Koizumi supporters are more aggressive about being involved with 
socio-political issues in urban areas and hence are more likely to serve as a lay judge.  
Summing the various estimated results I have presented so far, I arrive at the 
conclusion that taken together, the estimation results examined in this section are 
consistent with, and supported reasonably well, each of the Hypotheses put forward in 
the preceding section. Furthermore, the social network effect on people‟s willingness to 
serve as lay judges varies according to socio-economic circumstances, which differ 
between urban and other areas.   
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4.2.  Discussion 
Referring to historical the aspect of involvement in legal decision making, “Early 
English historical accounts demonstrate the important role played by community 
members without any particular training or specialization in law “(Hans 2003, p.84).  
Therefore, involvement of citizens in trials appears to be profoundly rooted in UK 
communities. Community is considered to play critical roles in alleviating both market 
and government failures, leading to economic development (Hayami 2001). Primarily, 
social capital accumulated through civic involvement within a local community leads 
people to further participate in various activities (Putnam 2000). Hence, community is 
considered to be important in creating an effective and well function lay judge system as 
it enhances the participation of people in the system. According to JSRC, “…various 
reforms assume as a basic premise peoples‟ transformation from governed objects to 
governing subjects, and at the same time seek to promote such transformation. This is a 
transformation in which the people will break out of viewing the government as the 
ruler (the authority) and instead will take a greater responsibility for governance …” 
(JSRC 2001, Chapter I Part1). Contrary to the premise, the lay judge system in Japan 
was introduced by the Government, partly in response to international competitive 
pressures. The severe secrecy requirement inhibits those participating in the lay judge 
from openly discussing trials with family or community members, even after the end of 
a trial.   
Increasing international competitive pressure was thought to have induced 
institutional innovations such as the lay judge system in Japan. Hence, besides wanting 
to realizing better justice and promote democracy, it seems also critical to educate the 
public about trials from an economics viewpoint. This is because accumulation of 
human capital is expected to improve the efficiency of trials. Learning from others such 
as family and neighbors appears to play a crucial role in accumulating human capital 
through social networks21. The strong requirements such as that of life time secrecy, 
seem to impede such mechanisms, resulting in a loss of efficiency. This loss is 
anticipated to become especially large when social networks exist and many people 
belong to such networks. It is thus appropriately argued that the obligation and its 
penalty on lay judges should be eased to improve operational efficiency.  
                                                   
21 Local spillovers such as learning from others play an important role in economic 
development (Goolsbee and Klenow 2002; Yamamura 2008c). 
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As mentioned earlier in the Section II, the secrecy requirement has been revised in 
response to criticism. Although the revisions are expected to make a contribution to 
enhancing peoples‟ participation, they are insufficient. Minimizing the negative 
externality caused by any breach of confidentiality, and maximizing the positive 
externality of information spillover are significantly important goals. They lead to 
increasing the net benefit of the lay judge system. In respect to information with privacy 
issues, it seems appropriately argued that the positive externality of the leakage of 
private information is small since such information fails to make a contribution to the 
accumulation of human capital. On the other hand, its negative externality is large 
since a fundamental human right is trampled on22. Furthermore, an individual will 
incur large psychological costs if his/her private information is leaked. Hence, it is 
appropriate to ensure such confidentiality. On the other hand, with respect to the 
“deliberation process”, such information is anticipated to make a great contribution to 
the education of members of the public concerning trials23. After the end of a trial, 
revealing the “deliberation process” is less likely to cause any negative effect since the 
results of the trail are not influenced. As a consequence, leakages regarding the 
“deliberation process” should not be punished if several years have passed after the end 
of the trial.  
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The introduction of a lay judge system was designed to bring benefits to modern 
Japanese society by enhancing public trust in the justice system (JSRC 2001). However, 
various surveys indicate that over half of those eligible to participate show no 
willingness to serve as a lay judge, although the Ministry of Justice has made efforts to 
encourage people to participate. To increase the benefits of the system, it will be 
necessary to consider the design of the lay judge system, as this has an influence on the 
people‟s incentive to participate. This research paid attention to the secrecy 
requirement, which is thought to raise the psychological cost to serve as a lay judge. 
Socio-economic factors also appear to influence people‟s perception and are associated 
with the effects of the secrecy requirement, leading to negative attitudes about the lay 
judge system. Hence, this work set out to investigate how and why incentives to serve as 
                                                   
22 The basic human right is based on the article 13 of the constitutional law. 
23 In the “Jury system” of U,S., a jury can discuss freely “the deliberation process” after 
the trial(Jones 2008, p112.). 
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a lay judge decrease by considering interactions between the secrecy requirement and 
social networks. I found through regression analyses that those who belong to a social 
network are less likely to be willing to serve as a lay judge. 
The closer the relationships within a family or among neighbors, the higher the 
psychological costs to adhere to the secrecy requirement. Therefore, not only as a result 
of this feature of the system and socio-economic conditions, but also from their 
interaction, incentives to serve as a lay judge decrease. Strong networks of 
interpersonal ties are thus shown to discourage people from serving as lay judges. 
Because of the life time secrecy obligation and the penalties faced by those who break it, 
people with close interpersonal ties are under great pressure and strain, leading to 
large psychological costs. From this situation I derive the argument that the obligation 
and its penalties should be eased to improve the attitude of people‟ toward the lay judge 
system. Furthermore, to educate the public about trials and to have their view reflected 
in the administration of the courts, it seems useful and productive for people who have 
participated in the system to talk over aspects of the trial with family and colleagues 
(Jones 2008). Information spillover from participants appears to be able to make a great 
contribution to the “establishment of a popular base”, which is one of the three main 
aims of the Justice System Reform (JSRC 2001). Considering a revision of the secrecy 
requirement more closely, information about the “deliberation process” appears useful 
and important when learning about trials, leading to benefits in the long run. On the 
other hand, this information is less likely to cause any negative externality as time will 
have passed.  These leads me to suggest that the lifetime secrecy obligation in respect 
to the “deliberation process” should be abolished and that information should be able to 
be divulged if several years have passed since the end of the trial.  
This study does not directly examine interactions between the secrecy requirement 
and social networks since the effects of the secrecy requirement cannot be captured by 
the sample used here. Hence, the results coming out of this study depend on the 
possibly debatable assumption that social networks are negatively related to people‟s 
attitudes, mainly as a result of the secrecy requirement. In accord with the argument of 
Putnam (2000), social networks would enhance people‟s involvement without such a 
secrecy requirement. It is also possible that the detrimental effect of social networks 
could be explained in other ways. Hence, it will be necessary to directly investigate how 
the secrecy requirement and social networks are associated regarding their influence on 
people‟s attitudes about the lay judge system. To this end, further research is called for 
to explore the effects of social networks if the secrecy requirement were to be revised 
18 
 
after the introduction of the lay judge system. This is an issue remaining to be 
addressed in future research. 
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Figure 1 
Rate of respondents showing willingness to serve as a lay judge.  
 
 
(a) Comparison between those with or without spouse (%) 
 
 
(b) Comparison between long-term residents and others (%) 
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(c) Comparison between homeowner and non-homeowner (%) 
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Table 1 
 Sample construction (Sample numbers) 
 Description  
Original Sample 
 
 1397 
Responds to a question about serving as a lay judge.  
 
 1200 
Characteristics (various variables appear in Table 2 and 
household income dummies).  
774 
(Used for Tables 2,3 and 4)  
   Respondents reside in mega-cities 
 
133 
(Used for Tables 2,3 and 4) 
   Respondents reside in other cities, towns or villages. 
 
641 
(Used for Tables 2,3 and 4) 
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Table 2 
 Comparisons between residents in mega-cities and others. 
Variables Mega-cities Others  ALL 
Respondents showing willingness to 
serve as a lay judge. (%) 
28.5 24.9 25.5 
Have spouse (%) 
 
  72.1 81.7  80.1 
Long-residents (%) 
 
   9.0   20.7   18.7 
Home-owner (%) 
 
  67.6   81.5   79.1 
Females (%) 
 
  39.0   48.5   46.8 
Years of schooling    13.2   12.4 
 
  12.6 
Age 
 
  56.6   54.6   55.0 
Self-employed(%) 
 
15.7   13.5   13.9 
Manager(%) 
 
   6.7    4.9    5.2 
Koizumi supporter(%) 
 
  66.9   60.8   61.8 
Household Income  
~2 million yen (%) 
  10.5    9.6    9.8 
Household Income  
2~4 million yen (%) 
  32.3   30.5   30.8 
Household Income  
4~6 million yen (%) 
  26.3   24.0   24.4 
Household Income  
6~8 million yen (%) 
   9.7   17.3   16.0 
Household Income  
8~ million yen (%) 
  21.0   18.4   18.8 
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Table 3 
 
Determinants of willingness to serve as a lay judge (Probit Model Estimation) 
Variables    (1) 
   
  (2) 
  
   (3) 
 
Spouse dummy 
 
-0.08* 
(-1.82) 
-0.06 
(-1.47) 
-0.07* 
(-1.67) 
Long residents dummy 
 
-0.12** 
(-3.15) 
 -0.10** 
(-2.76) 
Homeowner dummy. 
 
  
 
-0.10** 
(-2.36) 
 -0.07* 
(-1.79) 
Female dummy. 
 
-0.12** 
(-3.90) 
-0.10** 
(-3.08) 
-0.12** 
(-3.60) 
Years of Schooling  0.02** 
(3.97) 
0.02** 
(4.25) 
0.02** 
(4.09) 
Age -0.001* 
(-1.66) 
-0.0008 
(-0.69) 
-0.001 
(-1.00) 
Self-employed 
 
-0.003 
(-0.08) 
-0.01 
(-0.25) 
-0.001 
(-0.02) 
Manager 
 
0.006 
(0.11) 
0.01 
(0.27) 
0.004 
(0.07) 
Koizumi supporter 
 
0.11** 
(3.55) 
0.12** 
(3.74) 
0.11** 
(3.70) 
Household Income  
2~4 million yen dummy. 
0.0003 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.23) 
0.004 
(0.07) 
Household Income  
4~6 million yen dummy. 
0.05 
(0.77) 
0.07 
(1.14) 
0.06 
(0.99) 
Household Income  
6~8 million yen dummy. 
0.10 
(1.34) 
0.12* 
(1.66) 
0.12 
(1.56) 
Household Income  
8~ million yen dummy. 
0.19** 
(2.52) 
0.23** 
(2.89) 
0.22** 
(2.79) 
Obs 774 774 774 
Pseudo R-square 0.11 0.11  0.10 
Note. The dummy variable, which takes 1 if respondent shows willingness to serve as a lay judge, was the 
dependent variable. Values show marginal effect of each variable. Values in parentheses are z-statistics 
calculated by robust standard errors. * and ** denote significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. In 
all estimations, constant and city-size dummies are included, but not reported to save space. Concerning 
household income dummies, group of household income less than 200 million yen is default.  
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  Table 4 
Determinants of willingness to serve as a lay judge (Probit Model Estimation) 
Variables    (1) 
   
  (2) 
  
   (3) 
 
    (4) 
   
  (5) 
  
   (6) 
 
      Residents in mega-cities. 
     ( Urban areas ) 
  Residents in other places. 
Spouse dummy 
 
0.07 
(0.79) 
0.06 
(0.69) 
0.06 
(0.74) 
 -0.13** 
(-2.55) 
-0.11* 
(-2.27) 
-0.12** 
(-2.49) 
Long residents dummy 
 
-0.18 
(-1.27) 
 -0.14 
(-0.98) 
 -0.11** 
(-2.89) 
 -0.11** 
(-2.74) 
Homeowner dummy. 
 
  
 
-0.26** 
(-2.73) 
-0.24** 
(-2.47) 
   
 
 -0.05 
(-1.13) 
 -0.02 
(-0.57) 
Female dummy. 
 
-0.07 
(-0.85) 
-0.0007 
(-0.01) 
-0.01 
(-0.14) 
 -0.13** 
(-3.86) 
-0.11** 
(-3.21) 
-0.13** 
(-3.75) 
Years of schooling 0.02 
(1.63) 
0.02 
(1.43) 
0.02* 
(1.73) 
 0.02** 
(3.88) 
0.03** 
(4.21) 
0.02** 
(3.92) 
Age -0.003 
(-1.29) 
-0.0006 
(-0.22) 
-0.0007 
(-0.25) 
 -0.01 
(-1.07) 
-0.0007 
(-0.52) 
-0.001 
(-0.84) 
Self-employed 
 
0.08 
(0.69) 
0.07 
(0.62) 
0.10 
(0.81) 
 -0.02 
(-0.55) 
-0.03 
(-0.70) 
-0.02 
(-0.54) 
Manager 
 
0.27 
(1.56) 
0.26 
(1.56) 
0.26 
(1.62) 
 -0.04 
(-0.60) 
-0.02 
(-0.38) 
-0.04 
(-0.61) 
Koizumi supporter 
 
0.18* 
(2.08) 
0.19** 
(2.34) 
0.19* 
(2.24) 
 0.10** 
(2.96) 
0.10** 
(3.05) 
0.10** 
(3.02) 
Household Income  
2~4 million yen dummy. 
-0.11 
(-0.83) 
-0.09 
(-0.67) 
-0.08 
(-0.60) 
 0.02 
(0.31) 
0.04 
(0.54) 
0.02 
(0.33) 
Household Income  
4~6 million yen dummy. 
-0.06 
(-0.44) 
-0.01 
(-0.08) 
-0.001 
(-0.01) 
 0.07 
(0.97) 
0.09 
(1.25) 
0.08 
(1.03) 
Household Income  
6~8 million yen dummy. 
-0.16 
(-1.09) 
-0.07 
(-0.44) 
-0.09 
(-0.58) 
 0.14* 
(1.66) 
0.16* 
(1.83) 
0.14* 
(1.72) 
Household Income  
8~ million yen dummy. 
0.07 
(0.42) 
0.16 
(0.87) 
0.15 
(0.86) 
 0.21** 
(2.41) 
0.23** 
(2.60) 
0.22** 
(2.48) 
Obs 133 133 133  641 641 641 
30 
 
Pseudo R-square 0.15 0.17 0.18  0.11 0.11  0.12 
Note. The dummy variable, which takes 1 if respondent shows willingness to serve as a lay judge, was the dependent variable. Values 
show marginal effect of each variable. Values in parentheses are z-statistics calculated by robust standard errors. * and ** denote 
significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. In all estimations, constant and city-size dummies are included, but not reported to 
save space. Concerning household income dummies, group of household Income less than 2 million yen is default. 
 
 
 
 
 
